Elon Musk, seemingly disenchanted with Trump, recently mooted forming a third party, the "American Party."
Yawn.
Third parties have not only typically done poorly in American politics, there are solid arguments against forming them in the first place.
The former gets the most attention in the press, understandably because of how difficult it is for someone to win the Presidency without being a member of either party.
(Case in point: Donald Trump, who is not a conservative, joined the Republican Party when he decided to run.)
Two articles I encountered today consider this proposed enterprise. Or is it a stunt? With Musk, one never knows.
The first, at MSN, reviews the past record of failed third parties and the structural aspects of the American political system that favor two large parties, before concluding that this try differs in an important way:
But the presidency is not Musk's goal. He posted on July 4 that his goal would be "to laser-focus on just 2 or 3 Senate seats and 8 to 10 House districts."
Now that is a different kettle of fish. That is doable, at least in theory. And that really would alter American politics immediately.
Michael Tomasky sees this goal as difficult, but possible to achieve and sees the primary obstacles as (1) financial (easy for Musk to overcome) and (2) what such a party could stand for. The second Tomasky sees as a problem, but less so than does Alexander Burns of
Politico, who
sees opportunities:
Trump built his political rise on three areas of policy where much of the electorate felt unrepresented: immigration, trade and global security. He rejected Clinton- and Bush-era consensus on all three.
For Musk's new party to have a purpose, it must find similar ideological targets of opportunity.
The three Burns sees are:
- Championing free trade,
- Radical fiscal rebalancing, and
- Securing American technological and scientific supremacy.
The first two certainly fit in with the "radical libertarian" bent Tomasky attributes to Musk (whom I see as a mixed bag, especially given his appetite for subsidies). The third, not so much, except insofar as it might square with
leave universities alone and
stop attacking science, medicine, and agriculture.
Burns does not see this as an agenda for a party, and long-term, I think he's right.
I
could see a collection of candidates -- running together as a new party or merely promoting themselves as part of a caucus on any of these -- winning on such neglected issues and wielding outsized influence as a bloc for the next term.
But that brings me back to
solid arguments against forming third parties.
Back in 1842, an abolitionist
considered what happened when her fellows joined or formed parties in (B) below:
A. But you advise people not to vote for pro-slavery candidates, and not to join the liberty party; if this isn't non-resistance in politics, I don't know what is.
B. The difficulty in your mind arises, I think, from want of faith in the efficiency of moral influence. You cannot see that you act on politics at all, unless you join the caucus, and assist in electioneering for certain individuals; whereas you may, in point of fact, refuse co-operation, and thereby exert a tenfold influence on the destiny of parties. In Massachusetts, for instance, before the formation of a distinct abolition political party, both parties were afraid of the abolitionists; both wanted their votes; and therefore members of both parties in the legislature were disposed to grant their requests. All, who take note of such things, can remember how the legislature seemed to be abolitionized, as it were, by miracle. "The anti-slavery folks are coming strong this session," said a member to a leading democrat; "they want a hearing on five or six subjects at least." "Give 'em all they ask?" replied the leader; "we can't afford to offend them." When a similar remark was made to a whig leader, the same session, his answer was, "Concede everything; it wont do to throw them into the arms of the democrats." Now [that] there is a third party in Massachusetts, the two great parties have much less motive to please the abolitionists. Last year, the legislature of that State seemed to have gone back on anti-slavery, as fast as it once went forward. In Vermont, the system of refusing co-operation produced the effect of inducing both whigs and democrats to put up an abolition candidate, in order to secure the abolition votes; neither party was willing to give its opponent the advantage that might be gained by pleasing this troublesome class. Had we never turned aside from this plan, I believe the political influence of anti-slavery would have been an hundred fold greater than it now is. [Antislavery Political Writings, 1833-1860: A Reader, edited by C. Bradley Thompson, pp. 99-100, bold added]
As I see it, there is opportunity for an
ad hoc coalition of politicians who, say, favor free trade to win election and start the work of reining in Trump's abuse of his (constitutionally dubious) tariff power. But as members of a third party? They might still win, but would attract more opposition from
both parties, rather than just the "other" party, as they would in a normal election, anyway.
So, not only are three neglected issues (that I also don't see anyone integrating into part of a larger cause)
not a good basis for forming a political party, doing do risks merely marginalizing supporters of those issues/that cause, rather than causing more members of
both parties to start paying attention.
The only distinct thing about
this third party, then, is really its tactics, which
might succeed in the short-term, but which will fail long-term.
If I were Musk, I'd hold off on forming a party outright and support viable politicians more amenable to views I cared about and that there would probably be good support for, such as free trade.
-- CAV